Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets by S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson
Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete








Iowa City IA 52242
December 1997
Abstract
We construct a dynamic heterogeneous-agent model with random uninsur-
able endowments. Two allocation mechanisms are considered, one with long-
term complete credit arrangements under private information, and one with
incomplete competitive markets. A role for money arises due to random limited
participation. A Friedman rule is optimal in the …rst economy, and replicates
a pure credit arrangement in the second. Computational results show that
steady state allocations are quite di¤erent under the two arrangments, though
the responses to changes in long-run in‡ation are similar.
¤Rao Aiyagari died suddenly in May 1997. Rao made important early contributions to the
paper, but I bear full responsibility for the completed product. I have received useful comments and
suggestions from seminar participants at Johns Hopkins University and the University of Texas at
Austin.
11. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this paper is to study the implications of alternative money
and credit arrangements for the allocation of consumption and wealth in the steady
state. We construct an environment where agents have random uninsurable incomes,
and where there is a role for money which arises due to random limited participation
in the credit market. Two alternative credit arrangements are considered. First, we
allow agents to write long-term contracts, under private information, with …nancial
intermediaries (the private information, or PI model). Second, we consider a compet-
itive incomplete markets equilibrium (the incomplete markets or IM model) where
agents trade on a competitive bond market each period, and are subject to borrowing
constraints. In each of the two models, we allow for alternative assumptions about
commitment. Lack of commitment implies additional defection constraints in the PI
model, and additional borrowing constraints in the IM model.
In the literature on dynamic contractual arrangements under private information,
the incomplete markets, or permanent income, model has been an important bench-
mark. Green (1987) and Green and Oh (1991) contrasted the implications of pri-
vate information setups with incomplete markets models. Atkeson and Lucas (1992)
demonstrated that arrangements with competitive markets could not support opti-
mal allocations in a dynamic environment with private information about preference
shocks. Essentially, intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are di¤erent across
agents at the optimum, but they must necessarily be equated across agents in a
competitive equilibrium.
Models of dynamic contracts with private information1 typically rely on assump-
tions that agents’ consumptions can be observed, and that there are no unobservable
1See also Spear and Srivastava (1987), Phelan and Townsend (1991), Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995),
Atkeson and Lucas (1995), Phelan (1995), and Wang (1995).
2intertemporal trades among agents. If these assumptions are relaxed, this a¤ects
intertemporal incentives, as there is an attenuation of the rewards and punishments
available to induce truth-telling. Indeed, there are some results in the literature show-
ing that, for a limited class of private information environments, the only allocation
which can be supported is a competitive equilibrium allocation. In particular, Cole
and Kocherlakota (1997) show that, under some conditions, the e¢cient allocation
in an environment with unobserved incomes and hidden storage can be supported by
a competitive bond market. Similarly, Allen (1985) considers a repeated principal
agent model with unobserved lending and borrowing where the e¢cient outcome is
identical to the Walrasian allocation.
Thus, whether a PI or IM model is appropriate for a particular application would
seem to depend on the plausibility of assumptions regarding the observability or non-
observability of asset holdings in the context of the problem at hand. However, one
might ask whether, quantitatively, it makes any di¤erence. To draw an analogy to
the asset pricing literature (see Kocherlakota 1996), there are conditions under which
incomplete markets allocations with heterogeneous agents are very close to equilib-
rium allocations with complete markets. A key question we wish to address here is
whether a similar result holds in dynamic private information models. We consider an
environment with a continuum of in…nite-lived consumers and unobservable incomes,
similar to that of Green (1987), except that consumption is constrained to be non-
negative, the interest rate is endogenous, and there is a role for money.2 We compute
steady state solutions given PI and IM arrangements, compare the properties of these
solutions, and compare the responses to changes in long-run monetary policy.
In the PI model, credit takes the form of long-term contracts between consumers
and …nancial intermediaries. A consumer will hold money, in general, because she
2A similar environment is constructed in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b), and Williamson
(1997) examines a related random matching framework.
3may contact the …nancial intermediary at a time when she does not yet know her
current income. Due to this random limited participation problem, which is similar
in spirit to what occurs in the liquidity e¤ect models studied by Lucas (1990) and
Fuerst (1992), money is useful for insurance reasons. During any period, a consumer
may defect from her contract with the …nancial intermediary. If defection occurs, the
consumer can not interact with …nancial intermediaries again, and is restricted to
trading on the competitive money market in each succeeding period. The IM model
is similar to the PI model, except that credit arrangements take the form of lending
and borrowing on a competitive bond market. Consumers are subject to borrowing
constraints, as in Aiyagari (1994). As well, each consumer can repudiate her debt in
any period, which implies additional defection constraints, as in the PI model. If a
consumer repudiates her debt then she can not trade on the bond market again, but
can trade in the competitive money market forever.
Without defection constraints, the allocation in the PI model is e¢cient if the
monetary authority follows a Friedman rule. A Friedman rule is not optimal in the
IM economy, as no money growth rate achieves e¢ciency, but the Friedman rule
implies that the equilibrium allocation is equivalent to the equilibrium allocation in
an economy with a perfect credit system. When the defection constraints are not
imposed, the PI and IM allocations, holding constant the rate of money growth, are
quite di¤erent. The variability of consumption and of expected utilities across the
population are markedly higher in the IM economy than in the PI economy. As the
money growth rate increases, the mean level of expected utility and the variability in
expected utility tend to fall, and the variability in consumption rises. Except for the
e¤ects on the variability of consumption, these e¤ects are small however, so that the
welfare e¤ects of in‡ation are small. The e¤ects of these policy experiments are very
similar in the IM economy.
With defection constraints imposed, the results change dramatically. Now, an in-
4crease in the in‡ation rate decreases the value of defecting from credit arrangements,3
and this e¤ect is quantitatively large. In the PI model, the most e¢cient arrangement
is to do away with …at currency entirely, and to have all transactions done through
the centralized credit system. Again, the allocation of consumption and wealth across
the population, given the in‡ation rate, is quite di¤erent in the PI and IM economies,
but the response to policy is similar.
In Section 2 the model economies are constructed. Section 3 (4) looks at equi-
librium allocations in the PI (IM) model. Section 5 contains a discussion of pure
credit economies as a benchmark, and optimal monetary policy is derived. Section
6 discusses calibration and the computational methods, and Section 7 contains a
presentation of the computational results. Section 8 is a conclusion.
2. THE MODEL






where 0 < ¯ < 1; ct is consumption, and u(¢) is the period utility function. Here, u(¢)
is strictly increasing and strictly concave with u(0) = 0: We have ct ¸ 0 for all t: In
each period t, a consumer receives a random endowment yt; where yt 2 fy0;y1g with
0 · y0 < y1: Here, Pr[yt = y1] = ¼; where 0 < ¼ < 1: Endowments are i.i.d. over
time and across consumers, and they are private information.
The Private-Information Economy
We wish to consider two alternative allocation structures, which di¤er mainly ac-
cording to how the credit mechanism works. The …rst setup is in the spirit of the
3Corbae and Blume (1995) also consider a limited commitment problem where in‡ation a¤ects
the value of defection.
5allocation mechanisms in dynamic private information models (e.g. Green 1987 or
Atkeson and Lucas 1992, 1995), though a novelty here is that we allow a role for
money as in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b) and Williamson (1997).
At t = 0; consumers form …nancial intermediary coalitions. In general, we will
permit defection from these coalitions, the details of which will be discussed below.
We assume that the intermediary is able to observe consumers’ assets (here, their
money balances) at the beginning of each period. Let consumers be indexed by
i 2 [0;1]: During any period, there are two modes of interaction between consumer
i and the …nancial intermediary, dictated by the realization of the random variable
si
t 2 f0;1g; which is public information at the beginning of the period. Assume that
si
t is i.i.d. over time and across consumers, with Pr[si
t = 1] = ½; where 0 · ½ · 1:
If si
t = 1; then the consumer receives her current endowment yt at the beginning
of the period, and then makes a report zi
t 2 fy0;y1g to the …nancial intermediary
concerning her endowment, following which the intermediary makes a transfer of
consumption goods ¿t to the consumer. This transfer can be interpreted as a deposit
(if the transfer is negative) or a withdrawal (if it is positive). Alternatively, if si
t = 0;
then at the beginning of period t the consumer receives y0 units of the consumption
good (in all states of the world), then obtains the goods transfer from the …nancial
intermediary, and then …nally receives y1 ¡ y0 units of the consumption good with
probability ¼ and zero units with probability 1¡¼: Note that in the second case the
…nancial intermediary can not make the transfer contingent on the total endowment
the consumer receives during the period.
Consumer i enters period t with Mi
t units of …at money, where Mi
0 is given. After
receiving transfers from the …nancial intermediary, consumers can trade money for
consumption goods on a competitive market, where the price of consumption goods in
terms of money is pt: Also, at this point the consumer can defect from the long-term
contract with the …nancial intermediary. If defection occurs, the consumer is not
6permitted to interact with the …nancial intermediary (or any other intermediary) in
any succeeding period, but the consumer may still trade on the money market. Thus,
on defection the consumer faces the same opportunities for smoothing consumption
as an agent in a Bewley economy where the only asset is money (see Bewley 1980,
1983).
The monetary authority makes a transfer of Tt units of …at money per consumer
to …nancial intermediaries at the beginning of the period. Letting ¹ Mt denote the per
capita stock of …at money at the end of the period, the monetary authority must
meet the constraint






or, de…ning ¹ mt ´
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That is, current per capita real balances minus per capita real balances in the previous
period multiplied by the gross rate of return on money must equal the per capita
money transfer to consumers in units of consumption goods.
The Incomplete Markets Economy
The setup here is identical to the PI economy except for the following. Instead
of interacting with a …nancial intermediary, consumers trade in each period on a
bond market, where the one-period real interest rate is rt; and qt = 1
1+rt is the price
of a bond in period t which matures in period t + 1: As in the private information
economy, a consumer can be in one of two modes, determined by the realization of si
t:
If si
t = 1, then the consumer trades on the bond and money markets after receiving
her endowment yt: However, if si
t = 0; then the consumer receives y0 units of the
consumption good, then trades on the bond market, following which y1 ¡ y0 units of
the consumption good are received with probability ¼ and zero units with probability
71 ¡ ¼: The consumer then goes to the money market. After trading on the bond
market, the consumer has the option of defaulting on her debt. If defection occurs,
she may not trade on the bond market in any succeeding period.
There is a government which can issue currency, the supply of which is ¹ Mt: Also,
the government can issue one-period real bonds on the bond market. One real bond
issued in period t is a claim to one unit of the consumption good in period t+1: Let
¹ Bt denote the quantity of government bonds issued in period t: Currency is injected
through open market operations, i.e. swaps of currency for government bonds. The
government budget constraint then takes the form
¹ Mt ¡ ¹ Mt¡1
pt
= qt ¹ Bt ¡ ¹ Bt¡1 (2)
3. EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS IN THE PRIVATE
INFORMATION ECONOMY
We suppose that …nancial intermediaries can trade on a bond market, facing the
sequence of “e¢ciency prices” fqtg1
t=0; that is, there is trade in one period bonds
which sell at the price
qt
1¡qt in period t and pay o¤ 1
1¡qt+1 units of consumption in
period t + 1: An intermediary also treats the sequence of money prices of consump-
tion goods fptg1
t=0 parametrically: De…ning mt ´
Mt
pt to be the real balances of a
consumer, we suppose that the consumers who are members of the …nancial inter-
mediary agree on an initial distribution Ã0(w0;m0), i.e. a distribution of expected
utility entitlements w0 and real money balances m0 across the members of the …nan-
cial intermediary. Here, the initial distribution of money balances across consumers
is given, and expected utility entitlements are to be met through the design by the
…nancial intermediary of a history-contingent transfer policy and a speci…cation of
history-contingent trading by consumers on the money market.
Along the lines of Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995), Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995),
8Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a, 1997b), or Williamson (1997), we think of the …nan-
cial intermediary as solving a set of component problems to determine the optimal
contractual arrangements with each of its members. Speci…cally, there is a separate
cost minimization problemthat the intermediary solves for each initial (w0;m0) facing
fqtg1
t=0 and fptg1
t=0: We con…ne attention to steady states, where qt = q; °t = °; and
!t = ! for all t; where q; °; and ! are constants. Also, the distribution of expected
utilities and real money balances across consumers, Ã(w;m); is constant. Given that
any intermediary has a positive measure of consumers, each intermediary faces the
same steady state distribution Ã(w;m); and we can analyze this economy as if there
were only one representative …nancial intermediary.
The component planning problems can be speci…ed in recursive form by treating w;
the consumer’s expected utility, and m; her real money balances, as state variables,
and applying Green’s (1987) notion of temporary incentive compatibility.. Letting
v(w;m) denote the cost to the intermediary of delivering a level of expected utility w
at the current date to a consumer holding m units of real balances at that date, the
intermediary’s problem can be formulated in terms of the following Bellman equation.
v(w;m) = min
8
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subject to
w = (1 ¡ ¯)
2
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½¼u(y1 + m + ¿1(w;m) ¡ °m11(w;m))
+½(1 ¡ ¼)u(y0 + m + ¿0(w;m) ¡ °m10(w;m))
+(1 ¡ ½)¼u(y1 + m + ¿(w;m) ¡°m01(w;m))
+(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ¼)u(y0 + m + ¿0(w;m) ¡ °m00(w;m))
3







½¼w11(w;m) + ½(1 ¡ ¼)w10(w;m)




(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m+ ¿i(w;m) ¡ °m1i(w;m)) + ¯w1i(w;m) (5)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m+ ¿j(w;m) ¡°m1j(w;m)) + ¯w1j(w;m); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m)) + ¯w0i(w;m) (6)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0j(w;m)) + ¯w0j(w;m); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿i(w;m) ¡°m1i(w;m)) + ¯w1i(w;m) (7)
¸ ±(yi + m + ¿i(w;m)); i = 0;1;
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m)) + ¯w0i(w;m) (8)
¸ ±(yi + m + ¿(w;m)); i = 0;1;
yi + m+ ¿i(w;m) ¡ °m1i(w;m) ¸ 0; i = 0;1 (9)
yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m) ¸ 0; i = 0;1
mij(w;m) ¸ 0; i;j = 0;1: (10)
Here, the transfer when the endowment is high [low] and si
t = 1 is ¿1(w;m) [¿0(w;m)];
while the transfer when si
t = 0 is ¿(w;m): The consumer is assigned an expected
utility for the following period, which is wjk(w;m) when si
t = j and the endowment is
yk: The intermediary also recommends a quantity of real balances that the consumer
should hold at the beginning of the next period, mjk(w;m); where the subscripts have
the same meaning as for the expected utility assignment. Recommended real balances
then imply a recommended transaction for the consumer on the money market.
10The …nancial intermediary minimizes the present discounted value of goods trans-
fers to the consumer. The …rst constraint in the problem above, (4), is the promise-
keeping constraint, which states that contingent transfers, continuation expected
utilities, and recommend future money balances are consistent with the consumer
receiving current expected utility w: Constraints (5)-(6) are incentive compatibility
constraints, which state that it not be in the consumer’s interest to misreport her
endowment to the …nancial intermediary. The constraints (7) and (8) are defection
constraints. That is, in each period, given the consumer’s initial money balances,
endowment, and transfer from the …nancial intermediary, it should not be in her in-
terest to defect from the long-term contract with the intermediary in favor of trading
in the current and subsequent periods on the money market. Here, ±(y) is the value
of defecting with assets y; de…ned by the functional equation
±(y) = max
m0 f(1 ¡ ¯)u(y ¡°m
0) + ¯[¼±(y1 + m




0 ¸ 0; (12)
m
0 ¸ 0: (13)
Here, m0 is the quantity of real balances that the consumer would take into the
next period if she defected from the contract with the …nancial intermediary, (12)
is a nonnegativity constraint on consumption, and (13) is a nonnegativity constraint
on real balances. Finally, in the …nancial intermediary’s problem, (9) and (10) are
nonnegativity constraints on consumption and money balances, respectively.
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½¼ [m+ ¿1(w;m) ¡ °m11(w;m)]
+½(1 ¡ ¼)[m + ¿0(w;m) ¡ °m10(w;m)]
+(1 ¡ ½)¼ [m + ¿(w;m) ¡°m01(w;m)]
+(1 ¡½)(1 ¡ ¼)[m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m00(w;m)]
3
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5
dÃ(w;m) = 0; (14)
i.e. per capita transfers, through the …nancial intermediary and through money
market exchange, equal zero in the steady state.
Note that money plays two roles here. First, money balances allow consumers
to self-insure against the event that they cannot receive a contingent transfer from
the …nancial intermediary. This can be interpreted as a transactions role for money,
as in Bewley (1980, 1983). Second, current money balances communicate to the
intermediary the endowment shock of the consumer in the previous period, so that
money acts as a record-keeping device. The record-keeping role of money is studied
in Townsend (1987, 1989), and also in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1997).
E¢cient allocations should have the property that q · °; as otherwise (14) would
not hold. Money will thus be dominated in rate of return by bonds. In the case where
q < ° (i.e. money is strictly dominated in rate of return), we will have mij(m;w) = 0
for i = 1 and for (i;j) = (0;0): To see this, suppose that mij(m;w) > 0 for i = 1 and
for some j: Then, when si
t = 1 and yt = yj; the consumer trades o¤ claims to current
consumption for claims to future consumption by holding money balances. However,
this can be done more e¢ciently by the …nancial intermediary, which can reduce the
consumer’s transfers today and increase future transfers, while facing a higher interest
rate. The intermediary can thus meet all the constraints in the above optimization
problem while reducing the value of the objective function, so it cannot be optimal
to have mij(m;w) > 0 for i = 1. A similar argument holds for (i;j) = (0;0); given
that incentive compatibility requires that m01(m;w) ¸ m00(m;w):
While the problem (3) subject to (4)-(10) may appear formidable, it is possible
12to simplify it considerably. First, suppose that we perform a change of variables by
letting ¿¤
i (w) = ¿i(m;w) ¡ m; for i = 0;1; with w¤
ij(w) = wij(w;m) and m¤
ij(w) =
mij(w;m) for i;j = 0;1: Now, we can write the cost function as
v(w;m) = ¡(1 ¡ q)m+ µ(w);
and the choice variables ¿¤
i (w); i = 0;1; w¤
ij(w), and m¤
ij(w); i;j = 0;1; are inde-
pendent of m: Thus, the current consumption allocation, future money balances, and
future expected utility entitlement of the consumer are determined only by the cur-
rent expected utility entitlement and the current endowment. This simpli…cation of
the problem is very important for computational purposes, as the problem collapses
to a one-state-variable problem instead of a two-state-variable problem.
4. EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS
Here, as in Section 3, we con…ne attention to steady state allocations. The state
variable for a consumer’s optimization problem in the IM model is total assets, a;
where a = m+ b: Here, b denotes the quantity of bonds held at the beginning of the
period, and m denotes real balances. Let Á(a) denote the value function associated
with the consumer’s problem, which is de…ned by the Bellman equation
Á(a) = ½¼ max
m11;b11
[(1 ¡¯)u(y1 + a ¡ qb11 ¡ °m11) + ¯Á(b11 + m11)]
+½(1 ¡ ¼) max
m10;b10
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> > > > > > > > ;
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subject to
yk + a ¡ qbjk ¡ °mjk ¸ 0; for j = 1; k = 0;1; (15)
13yk + a ¡ qb0 ¡ °mjk ¸ 0; for j = 0; k = 0;1; (16)
mjk ¸ 0; for j;k = 0;1; (17)
bjk + mjk ¸ ¡
y0
(1 ¡q)
; for j = 1 and k = 0;1; (18)
b0 + m0k ¸ ¡
y0
(1 ¡ q)
; for k = 0;1: (19)
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + a ¡qb1i ¡ °m1i) + ¯Á(b1i + m1i) ¸ Â(yi + a ¡ qb1i); i = 0;1; (20)
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + a ¡qb0 ¡ °m0i) + ¯Á(b0 + m0i) ¸ Â(yi + a ¡ qb0); i = 0;1: (21)
Here, bjk is the value of the bonds the consumer chooses to have in period t+1 when
si
t = j and yt = yk; for j = 1 and k = 0;1; while b0 is the value of bonds the consumer
chooses to have in period t + 1 when si
t = 0: The steady state one-period interest
rate on bonds is 1
q ¡ 1: Inequalities (15) and (16) are nonnegativity constraints on
consumption, (17) are nonnegativity constraints on money balances, and (18) and
(19) are borrowing constraints. The latter state that a consumer can borrow at most
the present discounted value of the low endowment received for the inde…nite future.
That is, the borrowing constraints are implied by present value budget balance (see
Aiyagari 1994). Constraints (20) and (21) state that the consumer can not borrow an
amount that would be in her interest to repudiate. The value of repudiating debt b
when income is y and beginning-of-period assets are a is given by Â(y +a¡qb): Note
again, that if the consumer repudiates her debt, then she is excluded from the bond
market at all future dates and can only trade on the money market. The function
Â(¢) is determined by the functional equation
Â(x) = max
m0 f(1 ¡ ¯)u(x ¡ °m
0) + ¯[¼Â(y1 + m




0 ¸ 0; (22)
m
0 ¸ 0; (23)
14where m0 is the quantity of real money balances the consumer holds in the succeeding
period if repudiation occurs, (22) is a nonnegativity constraint on consumption, and
(23) is a nonnegativity constraint on real cash balances.
Clearly, we must have q · ° in a steady state, so that rate-of-return dominance is a
feature of this environment as for the PI model. Also, similar to the PI model, we will
have mjk = 0 for j = 1; and for (j;k) = (0;0): Consumers will end the period with
positive money balances only when si
t = 0 and they receive a high endowment. Here,
when si
t = 0, the consumer cannot use the credit market to smooth consumption in
the face of idiosyncratic income shocks, and must use money instead.




) = ¹ B(q ¡ 1): (24)
Let ¾(a) denote the steady state distribution of assets. Then, market clearing in the
steady state gives
Z
° [½¼m11(a) + ½(1 ¡ ¼)m10(a) + (1 ¡½)¼m01(a) + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ¼)m00(a)]d¾(a) = ¹ m
(the money market clears), and
Z
[½¼b11(a) + ½(1 ¡ ¼)b10(a) + (1 ¡½)b0(a)]d¾(a) = ¹ B
(the bond market clears).
5. PURE CREDIT ECONOMIES
In this section we wish to consider special cases of the above PI and IM models
where ½ = 1; so that money is not valued in equilibrium in either economy. We can
think of these special cases as “pure credit” economies. This will serve as a convenient
benchmark, particularly since the equilibrium allocation for the PI model when ½ = 1
is e¢cient, as we will show.
15Private Information
The …nancial intermediary’s problem when ½ = 1 reduces to a problem which is
similar to the one considered by Green (1987), except here we have a nonnegativity
constraint on consumption, the interest rate is endogenous, and there are defection





(1 ¡ q)[¼¿1(w) + (1 ¡ ¼)¿0(w)]






w = (1 ¡ ¯)
·
¼u(y1 + ¿1(w)) + (1 ¡¼)u(y0 + ¿0(w))
¸
(26)
+¯[¼w1(w) + (1 ¡¼)w0(w)]
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + ¿i(w)) + ¯wi(w) (27)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + ¿j(w)) + ¯wj(w); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
wi(w) ¸ ¼u(y1) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(y0); i = 0;1; (28)
yi + ¿i(w) ¸ 0; for i = 0;1: (29)
Here, z(w) is the cost function, ¿1(w) [¿0(w)] is the transfer in the high (low) endow-
ment state, and w1(w) [w0(w)] is the expected utility entitlement in the following pe-
riod when the current endowment is high (low). Equation (26) is the promise-keeping
constraint, (27) are the incentive constraints, (28) are the defection constraints (i.e.
the expected utility entitlement for next period cannot be less than the expected
utility in autarky), and (29) are nonnegativity constraints on consumption.
In the steady state, transfers must sum to zero across consumers. Thus, if Ã(w)
denotes the steady state distribution of expected utility entitlements, we must have
Z
[¼¿1(w) + (1 ¡ ¼)¿0(w)]dÃ(w) = 0: (30)
16As in Atkeson and Lucas (1995), Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995), and Aiyagari and
Williamson (1997a), the steady state allocation which is the solution to (25)-(30) is
e¢cient. We will next show that there are conditions under which any steady state
allocation with ½ 6= 1 is equivalent to the above pure credit allocation.
Proposition 1: With no defection constraints, i.e. deleting (7), (8), and (28), when
½ 6= 1; ° = q is optimal.
Proof. First, conjecture that when ° = q; a solution to (3) subject to (4)-(10)
(absent (7) and (8)) is v(w;m) = z(w)¡(1¡q)m; ¿1(w;m) = ¿1(w)¡m; ¿0(w;m) =
¿0(w) ¡ m; ¿(w;m) = ¿0(w) ¡ m; m01(w;m) =
¿0(w)¡¿1(w)
q ; mij(w;m) = 0 for (i;j) =
(1;1);(1;0);(0;0); wij(w;m) = wi(w) for i;j = 0;1; where z (w); ¿1(w); ¿0(w); w1(w);
w0(w) is the solution to the pure credit problem, (25) subject to (26)-(29) (absent
(28)). We have already shown that mij(w;m) = 0 for (i;j) = (1;1);(1;0);(0;0): Now,
substituting in the Bellman equation (3), we obtain
z(w) ¡ (1 ¡ q)m = min
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(1 ¡ q)[¼¿1(w) + (1 ¡ ¼)¿0(w)]





Similarly, substituting in the constraints (4)-(9), we obtain the constraints (26), (27),
and (29), and constraint (10) is also satis…ed. Thus, the solution to the …nancial
intermediary’s problem is the same for any ½ when ° = q: Now, it remains to be
shown that in the steady state the aggregate resource constraint, (14), is satis…ed.
Substituting in (14), and given (30), it is straightforward to show that this is the
case.2
17Thus, a Friedman rule is optimal if there are no defection constraints. That is, at
the optimum the real rates of return on money and on bonds are equivalent, and the
nominal interest rate is zero. However, it will typically be the case that, in a pure
credit equilibrium, q > ¯ (see Atkeson and Lucas 1994 and Aiyagari and Williamson
1997a), i.e. the real interest rate is less than the rate of time preference. In Friedman
(1969), the real interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference at the optimum.
Incomplete Markets
Here, when ½ = 1 the Bellman equation associated with the consumer’s problem
in the steady state is
´(a) = ¼ max
a1 [(1 ¡ ¯)u(y1 + a ¡ qa1) + ¯´(a1)] (31)
+(1 ¡ ¼)max
a0 [(1 ¡ ¯)u(y0 + a ¡ qa0) + ¯´(a0)]
subject to




; for i = 0;1; (33)
´(ai) ¸ ¼u(y1) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(y0); i = 0;1; (34)
where a now denotes the quantity of bonds the consumer enters the period with,
and ai denotes bonds acquired when the endowment is yi; for i = 0;1: In the above
Bellman equation, ´(a) is the value function, (32) is a nonnegativity constraint on
consumption, (33) is the borrowing constraint, and (34) is the defection constraint.
The market-clearing condition is
Z
[¼a1(a) + (1 ¡ ¼)a0(a)]d·(a) = 0:
That is, the bond market clears, given the steady state distribution of assets ·(a):
18It is straightforward to show that, when ° = q; and ½ 6= 1; there exists a steady
state equilibrium allocation for the incomplete markets economy that replicates the
steady state equilibrium allocation when ½ = 1: That is, given that rates of return are
identical on money and bonds when ° = q; consumers will make the same portfolio
choices when ½ 6= 1 as in the pure credit economy with ½ = 1: This then implies
that we will obtain ·(a) = ¾(a) (the steady state asset distributions are identical in
the two economies), and the money balances held by consumers will be backed by
government loans to the same consumers, which net out on the consolidated balance
sheet of the private sector.
Though there is a similarity here to Proposition 1 for the private-information con-
strained economy, in terms of the equivalence between money/credit economies and
pure credit economies when ° = q, we cannot say that ° = q is optimal in any
sense, since the pure credit economy with incomplete markets is in general not e¢-
cient. That is, the e¢cient allocation for this environment is given by the solution to
(25)-(30) for which, as in Atkeson and Lucas (1992), intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution are not equated, in general, across agents. However, intertemporal mar-
ginal rates of substitution are equated across agents in the pure credit competitive
equilibrium for the incomplete markets economy, so that the pure credit PI and IM
allocations di¤er. Thus, the IM allocation is in general not e¢cient, even if ° = q:
6. CALIBRATION AND COMPUTATION
We use the PI economy as a benchmark, setting parameters so that the steady state
allocation matches observed features of the U.S. economy. We interpret a period as
one quarter, and set y0, y1; and ¼ so as to match the variability in quarterly household
income. Using PSID data, Aiyagari (1994) argues that a …rst-order autoregression
closely matches the time series properties of annual earnings, with a range of .23 to
.53 for the …rst-order serial correlation coe¢cient, and a coe¢cient of variation in
19unconditional earnings of 20 to 40 percent. Since it is not tractable to introduce
serial correlation in endowments in the private information model, we must do the
best we can to …t an i.i.d. endowment shock in the model to the data. This is not
too problematic, as the estimated serial correlation in annual data is low, and serial
correlation for quarterly data would then be even lower. If we take the coe¢cient
of variation to be 30 percent for annual data, then if quarterly income is i.i.d., the
coe¢cient of variation for quarterly data would be 60 percent. Thus, we set ¼ = :5;
y0 = 1¡²; and y1 = 1+²; with ² = :6: The utility function we use is u(c) = 1¡e¡®c;
with ® = 1; which implies a coe¢cient of relative risk aversion of unity at the mean
endowment. The constant relative risk aversion utility function is convenient as it is
bounded. The remaining parameters, ½; ¯; and °; were set so as to produce a steady
state equilibrium allocation which would match observed average real interest rates,
in‡ation rates, and the observed fraction of transactions for which currency was used.
From the real business cycle literature (Prescott 1986), the real interest rate is taken
to be 1% per quarter, so in an e¢cient steady state we want q = :99: A survey of
households by the Federal Reserve (Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell, and Spindt 1987),
conducted in 1984, …nds that 24% of the current value of transactions is carried out




f[1 ¡(1 ¡ ½)¼](m + !) + (1 ¡ ½)¼ j m + ! + ¡°m01(m;w) jgdÃ(m;w);




[½¼ j ¿1(m;w) j +½(1 ¡ ¼) j ¿0(m;w) j +(1 ¡½) j ¿(m;w) j]dÃ(m;w):
When the Federal Reserve survey was done, the in‡ation rate was approximately 1%
per quarter, so we set ° = 1:01 for calibration purposes.
Solutions were computed for the PI economy as follows. First, grids were chosen
for the two state variables, w and m: With no defection constraints, the lower bound
20on expected utility, w; is ¼u(y1 ¡ y0) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(0); which is the minimum incentive
compatible level of expected utility that can be imposed on a consumer, and the lower
bound on m is zero. Since choice variables in the …nancial intermediary’s problem are
independent of m; it is only necessary to solve the problem at each point along the w
grid, and for a single value for m; say m = 0; and then use this solution to determine
the solution for all points on the grid. We start with an initial guess for q 2 (¯;1);
and make an initial guess for the function µ(w): Then, value iteration is used to arrive
at the solution for µ(w) given q. At each iteration, µ(w) is updated by …tting a third-
order Chebychev polynomial (plus an additional term,
1
1¡w; which performed well in
…tting the true cost function), to the values computed for the cost function at points
on the grid on the previous iteration. When convergence is achieved given q; then the
decision rules are interpolated across a …ner grid, and a matrix of Markov transition
probabilities for the state w is constructed as an approximation using a lottery over
the two closest grid points. A limiting distribution over w is computed, the analogue
of the left-hand side of (14) is evaluated, and q is updated according to a bisection
method. Then value-iteration is performed again, etc. For the incomplete markets
economy, the computational procedure is similar, except that the state variable is
now total assets, a; and we iterate on the value function rather than a cost function.
To match the observed real interest rate and the evidence from the Federal Reserve
survey on household transactions, we set ¯ = :99 and ½ = :81; in computing the
allocation for the PI economy: This implies that q = :99 (slightly greater than ¯; but
the di¤erence is on the order of 10¡5) and that currency accounts for 24% of the value
of transactions.
Aftercalibrating the PI model to U.S. data, we compute solutions forthe PI and IM
economies, varying °, the gross in‡ation rate. We can thus compare allocations and
the response topolicy in the twomodels. One di¢culty here is in evaluatingthe e¤ects
of policy on welfare. In solving for a steady state in either model, we determine the
21steady state distribution of expected utilities across the population. One approach to
evaluating the welfare e¤ects of a change in policy would be to use a Hicksian welfare
measure, whereby we would convert welfare changes into consumption-equivalents,
and then simply add these across the population. However, in this context this
may give nonsensical answers. To take an extreme example, consider the setup in
Atkeson and Lucas (1992) which is a model where there is private information about
preference shocks. Atkeson and Lucas’s model has the property that, with e¢cient
allocation, a vanishing fraction of the population consumes all output in the limit.
This is true, for example, with log utility. However, one incentive compatible (but
ine¢cient) allocation isforagents toconsume equal sharesof total output each period.
According to the Hicksian welfare measure, this steady state allocation dominates the
e¢cient allocation.
For our environment, we know that the pure credit allocation for the PI model
is e¢cient. Our approach here is to use a measure of the distance of the limiting
distribution of expected utilities from the e¢cient distribution as a measure of the
welfare cost of in‡ation. Since for the welfare measure we use it is necessary that lim-
iting probabilities be bounded away from zero, we use a kernel estimation technique
(Silverman 1986). That is, we estimate the density function f(x) associated with the










where h is the “window width,” ·i is the limiting probability associated with expected
utility level wi; n is the number of grid points for expected utilities, and K(¢) is a
probability density function. For K(¢); the standard normal density function provided
a good …t of the estimated density function to the limiting probabilities. Choosing a
grid for x; we let fj = f(xj) for j = 1;2; :::; `; and then compute the “welfare loss,”





where g(x) denotes the limiting distribution with pure credit (½ = 1). This distance
measure is adapted from an approach in information theory used by Kullback (1959).
7. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
We …rst consider results for pure credit allocations in Tables 1 and 2, and in Figures
1-3. Table 1 shows, for the PI economy, the mean level of expected utility, standard
deviation of expected utility, unconditional standard deviation of consumption, and
the cost of in‡ation (the distance measure discussed in the previous section), for
annual in‡ation rates running from the Friedman rule rate (-3.94% per annum) to
an (incipient) in‡ation rate su¢ciently high that money is not held. The entries in
Table 2 are similar, but for the IM economy.
Table 1: No Defection Constraints, Private Information
Annual In‡ation Rate Mean E.U. S.D. of E.U. S.D. of Cons. Welfare Cost
-3.94% .6270 .0519 .1508 0
10% .6270 .0515 .1549 0:07
100% .6262 .0500 .1908 0.04
1500% .6173 .0452 .2964 2.58
>non-mon. threshold .6156 .0450 .3066 5.47
First, comparing the …rst row of Table 1 with the …rst row of Table 2, note that
mean expected utility is lower in the IM economy than in the PI economy, and that
the dispersion in expected utilities is higher in the IM economy. Figure 1 shows plots
of the distributions of expected utilities in each case. We would expect the average
level of expected utility to be lower in the IM economy, as risk sharing is less e¢cient.
23Dispersion in expected utilities is higher because, with less risk sharing, there is also
less sluggishness in expected utilities. That is, the IM allocation is incentive compat-
ible, but the incentive constraints do not bind, so that expected utilities move from
period to period more than is necessary to meet the incentive constraints. This will
tend to result in greater dispersion in expected utilities in the steady state. The stan-
dard deviation of consumption is higher in the IM economy for two reasons. First,
since risk sharing is not as e¢cient in the IM economy, consumption will tend to be
more variable conditional on the level of expected utility. Second, the variability of
expected utilities is higher in the IM economy, and consumption increases with ex-
pected utility, so that the unconditional variability in consumption in the IM economy
will tend to be higher as a result. Figures 2 and 3 show consumption as a function of
expected utility in the steady state for the PI and IM economies, respectively. Here,
c0 (c1) denotes consumption in the low (high) income state. Note that risk-sharing is
quite good in both cases, but that variability in consumption, conditional on expected
utility, is higher in the IM economy than for the PI economy.
Table 2: No Defection Constraints, Incomplete Markets
Annual In‡ation Rate Mean E.U. S.D. of E.U. S.D. of Cons. Welfare Cost
-3.94% .6167 .0825 .2218 43.56
10% .6165 .0825 .2477 35:49
100% .6156 .0825 .1984 34.93
1500% .6059 .0824 .3284 34.61
>non-mon. threshold .6042 .0824 .3567 34.58
Though Tables 1 and 2 show a substantial di¤erence between the PI and IM
economies in terms of the distributions of expected utilities and consumptions, the
response to in‡ation is quite similar in the two economies. Table 1 shows a small
response of the distribution of expected utilities to in‡ation. Note that, in Figure
244, there is only a small di¤erence in the distributions of expected utilities for the
Friedman rule rate of in‡ation and for the case where money is not held. That is,
the number 5.47 in the last row and last column of Table 1, denoting the distance
between the two distributions in Figure 4, is a small number.4 The critical rate of
in‡ation at which money is just driven out of circulation is approximately 2,000 per
cent per annum. Table 2 and Figure 5 show similar results for the IM economy. The
e¤ects of in‡ation on the distribution of expected utilities is small. Note, in Table 2,
that the costs of in‡ation are relative to the Friedman rule in‡ation rate for the PI
economy, since this yields the e¢cient steady state distribution of expected utilities.
From Table 2, the IM economy which is most e¢cient, i.e. yields the steady state
distribution of expected utilities closest to e¢ciency, is the one without currency.
However, the costs of in‡ation do not change much as the in‡ation rate changes, and
the IM economy without currency is still far from being e¢cient.
Though the e¤ects of in‡ation on the distribution of expected utilities are small in
the PI and IM economies, with mean expected utility and the standard deviation of
expected utility falling as in‡ation rises, the e¤ects on the distribution of consumption
are large. With higher in‡ation, consumers decrease holdings of cash balances, so
that they are less capable of insuring against income shocks in the state where they
are subject to the limited participation problem. Figures 6 and 7, which should be
compared to Figures 2 and 3, respectively, show consumption in the high-income state
(c1) and low-income state (c0) for the PI and IM economies, respectively, given an
in‡ation rate of 10% per annum. In Table 1, the standard deviation of consumption
increases by a factor of about 2 as the in‡ation rate increases from the Friedman rule
rate to an incipient rate su¢ciently high to drive out currency. In Table 2, the e¤ect
is of a similar magnitude, but note that the standard deviation of consumption is
4The Hicksian welfare loss for the average consumer of having to do without currency, relative
to the Friedman rule, for the PI economy, is approximately 3% of average consumption.
25nonmonotonic in the in‡ation rate in the IM economy.
The results where defection constraints are imposed are reported in Tables 3 and 4,
and in Figures 8-11. Here, a Friedman rule isno longer optimal, and in‡ation will have
two e¤ects. First, as in the case with no defection constraints, real balances decrease
with in‡ation, consumers can not smooth consumption as e¤ectively, and welfare
will tend to decrease. Second, as in‡ation increases, the value of defection, either
from intermediary contracts (PI economy) or bond market trading (IM economy),
decreases, as there is a greater tax on money holdings if defection occurs. This
second e¤ect will tend to increase welfare. That is, in the PI economy, the incentives
open to the …nancial intermediary will be better with higher in‡ation, and in the IM
economy higher in‡ation implies that the lower bound on borrowing decreases, so
the consumer is better able to smooth consumption. Table 3 shows that the second
e¤ect dominates the …rst in the PI economy. That is, in the last column of Table
3, the welfare cost of in‡ation falls as the in‡ation rate rises, and the distribution of
expected utilities which is closest to e¢ciency is the one where there is no currency
in circulation. Note that the two distributions in Figure 8 are much further apart
than the two in Figure 10.
Table 3: Defection Constraints, Private Information
Annual In‡ation Rate Mn. E.U. SD(EU) SD(Cons) Int. Rate Welfare Cost
-1.37% .6308 .0035 .0783 1.37% 478.56
10% .6313 .0056 .0635 3.35% 373.65
100% .6298 .0114 .0952 3.72% 130.54
1500% .6209 .0136 .2609 3.89% 60.87
>non-mon. threshold .6166 .0243 .2813 3.82% 12.58
Further, in the second and third columns of Table 3, note that mean expected
utility falls while the standard deviation of expected utility rises as in‡ation increases
26(since in‡ation relaxes the defection constraint). In column 4 of Table 3, the stan-
dard deviation of consumption increases with in‡ation, though not monotonically.
The interest rate increases (see column 5 of Table 4) as the e¤ect of in‡ation is to
permit lower levels of consumption through the relaxation of the defection constraint
(note that consumption increases monotonically with expected utility). For the bond
market to clear, the interest rate must then be higher, as this will encourage agents
to postpone consumption, and they will then tend to consume more in the steady
state.
Table 4: Defection Constraints, Incomplete Markets
Annual In‡ation Rate Mean E.U. S.D. of E.U. S.D. of Cons. Int. Rate Welfare Cost
-3.16% .6379 .0086 .2477 3.27% 305.26
10% .6299 .0131 .1130 3.64% 127:86
100% .6257 .0251 .0291 3.93% 39.19
1500% .6102 .0341 .2225 3.93% 56.59
>non-mon. threshold .6093 .0392 .2873 3.89% 66.87
Most of the e¤ects of in‡ation in the IM economy (in Table 4) are similar to those
for the PI economy, with two exceptions. First, it is not optimal to drive currency
out of the IM economy. The closest expected utility distribution to the e¢cient one
is achieved with an in‡ation rate of 100%. Also, note in column 5 of Table 4 that
interest rates are lower as compared to Table 3 for low rates of in‡ation. That is,
defection constraints have a smaller “precautionary savings” e¤ect in the IM economy
than in the PI economy at a low rate of in‡ation. Figures 9 and 11 are the analogues
of Figures 8 and 10.
Clearly, it makes a di¤erence for the distribution of consumption and wealth
whether we study this environment using the theory of dynamic contracts under pri-
vate information, or using an incomplete markets competitive equilibrium approach.
27However, the choice appears to matter less for the policy implications in this context.
That is, at the margin, in‡ation alters the allocation of consumption and wealth in
much the same way in either case. This is not to say that the two models will yield the
same policy implications under all circumstances. One could imagine policy interven-
tions, for example government lending programs or unemployment insurance, where
the choice of a complete contracts approach (the PI model) versus an incomplete
markets approach should make a big di¤erence for the conclusions.
8. CONCLUSION
In the environment considered here, there is a continuum of in…nite-lived agents
each of whom receive a stream of unobservable random endowments. We consider
two arrangements for sharing risk; in the …rst (the PI economy) there are complete
long-term contracts between consumers and …nancial intermediaries, and in the sec-
ond (the IM economy) there is a competitive bond market. In both models there is
a role for money arising from random limited participation in credit markets. The
two models produce steady state distributions of expected utilities and consumption
across agents that are very di¤erent. In general, the variability in expected utilities
and in consumption is higher in the IM economy. However, the e¤ects of in‡ation
in the two models are similar. In the absence of defection constraints, higher in‡a-
tion has small e¤ects on welfare, with the distribution of expected utilities changing
only slightly, but the variability in consumption tends to increase by a large amount.
With defection constraints, in‡ation is good for incentives in that it decreases the
value of defecting in the PI economy. In the IM economy, in‡ation relaxes borrowing
constraints. These e¤ects are large, and they imply that eliminating currency trans-
actions is optimal in the PI economy, and a high rate of in‡ation is optimal in the
IM economy.
How seriously should we take these results concerning the optimality of high in-
28‡ation, or eliminating government-supplied currency altogether? Clearly, our model
leaves out some of the important costs of in‡ation, such as distortions introduced
in labor supply decisions, and e¤ects on growth, capital accumulation, and …nancial
intermediation, some of which are captured in work by Cooley and Hansen (1989),
Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and Lacker and Schreft (1996). However, there is some-
thing important captured in our model that is omitted in the literature on the costs
of in‡ation. That is, government-supplied currency permits transactions and wealth
to be hidden, these hidden transactions and wealth may be socially costly, and tax-
ing them through in‡ation or outright elimination of government-supplied currency
might be an e¢cient thing to do. There may be an important role for physical media
of exchange, but such a role might be e¢ciently played by non-anonymous privately-
supplied smart cards.
We hope that this paper provides some help in evaluating when complete con-
tracting private information approaches are useful relative to incomplete markets ap-
proaches. The incomplete markets approach has some advantage in general in terms
of computational ease (though the advantage is not very big in this context), but oth-
erwise the private information model seems preferable, unless one does not believe
the assumptions on asset observability required to make the approach tractable. Of
additional interest is the novel approach to modeling money here, which is tractable
in both models, and potentially applicable to a wide variety of problems.
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